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Inference in Text Understanding
Allan Collins, John Seely Brown, & Kathy M. Larkin
INTRODUCTION
When people understand a text, they do not simply connect the
events in the text into a sequential structure. Rather they seem to
create a complex scenario or model within which the events described
might plausibly occur (Bransford & Johnson, 1973). This model-based
view suggests that we cannot characterize inference procedures
solely in terms of finding connections between elements in a text.
But it in turn raises a number of unanswered questions about how
people understand texts. For example:
1. What precisely is meant by a model of the text?
2. How do people synthesize these models?
3. How do people revise their initial models?
4. Why do people select one model over another?
In order to study how people construct and revise models, we
gave subjects five difficult-to-understand texts and recorded
protocols of the processing they went through to make sense of the
texts. The results indicated that skilled readers use a variety of
strategies for revising and evaluating different models, finally
converging on a model that best accounts for the events described in
the text. These strategies concern the ways that skilled readers
deal with the difficulties that arise in comprehension. By making
these strategies explicit, we can possibly provide less skilled
readers with strategies for what to do when they don't understand a
text.
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Text-Based vs. Model-Based Inference
Classically in cognitive psychology and artificial
intelligence, inference is thought of as filling in the missing
connections between the surface structure fragments of the text by
recourse to context and knowledge about the world. This text-based
view of inference stresses the notion that the inference process
looks for meaningful relations between different propositions in the
text. Such a view permeates semantic network theory (Quillian,
1969; Rumelhart, Lindsay & Norman, 1972), conceptual dependency
theory (Schank, 1972; Rieger, 1975), demon-based approaches
(Charniak, 1972) and cognitive psychology (Anderson & Bower, 1973;
Frederiksen, 1975; Kintsch, 1974).
An alternative model-based view argues that a central purpose
of inference is to synthesize an underlying model, which organizes
and augments the surface structure fragments in the text. In this
view, inference is controlled by a target structure that specifies
the a priori constraints on the kind of model to be synthesized.
This target structure acts as an organizational principle for
guiding a set of inference procedures.
If this target is a non-generative structure, then this view is
extremely similar to the view that the purpose of inference is to
select and fill out a set of frames (Charniak, 1975; Minsky, 1975;
Winograd, 1975) or scripts (Schank & Abelson, 1975; Lehnert, 1977)
or schemas (Bobrow & Norman, 1977; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). If, v
however, the target is a generative structure, like a grammar, it
can produce a potentially infinite number of possible models. In
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the latter case, the control exercised by the target structure is
more subtle, requiring the growing of the target structure hand in
hand with filling in the variables of the model (Bobrow & Brown,
1975).
Methodology for studying model-based inference
We studied the four questions in the first section by reading
five short, but difficult-to-understand passages to four different
subjects. We recorded the subjects' protocols after they had heard
the entire text. The subjects were asked to describe how they
processed the text, whether they had any intermediate hypotheses
along the way, whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied with any
of these hypotheses, and why. Subjects could ask to have the text
reread if they wanted. The texts ranged from a fragment of a
mystery story to a recipe for an unspecified food. Analysis of
these protocols suggests some initial answers to the questions
listed above.
Two of the texts we used are given below. We will describe our
theory of text understanding in terms of how two of the subjects
dealt with these texts. At the same time we will try to point out
other cases where the same phenomena occurred in other protocols.
It will help the readers to think about and remember their own
processing as they read these texts:
Window Text
He plunked down $5 at the window. She tried to give him
$2.50, but he refused to take it. So when they got inside,
she bought him a large bag of popcorn.
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Boating Text
John and Bill were sailing on Mystic Pond and they saw a
coffee can floating in the distance. Bill said, "Let's go
over and pick it up." When they reached it, John picked it
up and looking inside said, "Wow, there are rocks in the
can." Bill said, "Oh, I guess somebody wanted the can to
float there."
Because the passages were difficult to understand, subjects
were able to give us valuable clues to their model-synthesis
process. Equally revealing were the unsatisfactory hypotheses that
people discarded along the way, and the reasons why they decided to
do so. The theory described below is our interpretation of the
processing revealed by these subjects' protocols.
A PROGRESSIVE-REFINEMENT THEORY OF TEXT UNDERSTANDING
Overview of the Theory
We will outline our theory briefly first. Then we will expand
each of these ideas in more detail. The theory states that text
understanding proceeds by progressive refinement from an initial
model to more and more refined models of the text. The target
structure guides the construction process, constraining the models
to the class of well-formed, goal-subgoal structures that means-ends
analysis (Newell & Simon, 1963) produces. The initial model is a
partial model, constructed from schemas triggered by the beginning
elements of the text. Successive models incorporate more and more
elements from the text. The models are progressively refined by
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trying to fill the unspecified variable slots in each model as it is
constructed. As the questions associated with the unfilled slots in
more refined models become more and more specific, the search for
relevant information is constrained more and more. The overall
process is one of constraint satisfaction (Fikes, 1970; Waltz,
1975).
The refinement process makes use of a variety of
general-purpose problem solving strategies. These include rebinding'
a variable when its binding leads to a conflict, trying different
variable bindings when there are a number of possible alternatives,
questioning the bindings on other variables that lead either
directly or indirectly to a conflict, questioning any default
assumptions when there is a conflict, and focusing on another part
of the problem when you aren't getting anywhere. People pursue this
refinement process until it converges on a solution that satisfies a
number of conditions for a plausible model.
The Target Structure
The theory states that people try to understand the actions and L/
events in a text in terms of characters applying means-ends analysis
(Newell & Simon, 1963) to solve the problems that occur in the text.
Means-ends analysis operates as follows: If there is a method to
reach a goal directly and its preconditions are met, then apply that
method. If the preconditions for the method are not met, then
generate a subgoal to satisfy these preconditions. When a subgoal
is generated, apply means-ends analysis recursively to reach that
subgoal. If there is no way to satisfy the preconditions for that
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method, then look for another method that can be applied to reach
that goal, etc. Means-ends analysis thus puts certain constraints
on the permissible structures that interrelate events in the text.
For example, a subgoal must be a means to satisfy the preconditions
for a method applicable to a higher goal. Failures in trying to
apply a method must lead to application of other possible methods
for obtaining the same goal or a higher goal. But within these
constraints there are still a potentially infinite set of plans or
solutions to a problem depending on the particular subgoals and
methods generated.
Story grammars (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975,
1977b) are an attempt to specify the class of well-formed target
structures in the domain of stories. But the target structures for
other domains pertinent to text understanding can also be
characterized as goal-subgoal structures. For example, the recipe
used in our study consists of a set of steps for mixing ingredients
and then steps for cooking. Subjects attempted to understand the
recipe by figuring out the overall goal of the recipe, from the set
of subplans specified in the recipe. These target structures are a
kind of tacit knowledge that guides people to make sense of texts in
terms of goals and subgoals.
What is missing from story grammars, but is crucial to the way
a target structure guides the construction of models is a notion of
planning knowledge (Brown, Collins, & Harris, 1978). In the domain
of stories this planning knowledge consists of knowledge about
social goals and deltacts (i.e. acts to reduce differences between
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present states and goal states), about specific methods for
achieving particular deltacts, about the ordering on these methods,
and about the preconditions and results of each method (Abelson
1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977). This planning knowledge places
enormous constraints on the way people construe stories; for
example, giving somebody money is a method for getting that person
to give you possession of something, but it is not a method for
conveying information to them. In order to construct a model of the
text, the comprehender must identify events in the story with
different methods, figure out the goals that those methods are being
used to achieve, identify whether those methods succeed or fail,
bind successes to satisfy preconditions for higher goals, and relate
failures to alternative plans to achieve the same higher goals. In
the next section we will try to indicate how this planning knowledge
is invoked in constructing a model of the window text.
Constructing an initial model of the text.
We can best illustrate the process by which subjects construct
a model in terms of the window text, because this text almost always
leads people down a false path. The protocol below shows the kind
of mistake subjects make initially in interpreting this text.
When you said he plunked down $5 at the window, I
thought he was at the racetrack, because I decided it was
a betting window. The amount of money really didn't tell
me anything. I didn't think the $5 was what you bet on a
horse or anything like that, but somehow the window part
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of it; I don't think of the movie theater as having a
window, I think of it as a box office. And the only place
I can think of as a window is a betting window. So I
thought that was a racetrack.
So then when you said she, I thought that was the
person behind the window. And when she tried to give him
$2.50 back, I thought that was his change. When he said
he wouldn't accept it, I started wondering. Because I
can't imagine anyone not accepting his change from a bet
at a horsetrack. If the next sentence had been something
like he gave her $.50 because that had really been $3
instead of $2.50, then that whole hypothesis would have
fit together. I prepared myself for that; I had that
expectation that there was going to be some sort of
exchange of how much the bet really was. I was trying to
hang on to my original hypothesis which was that he was at
a racetrack.
The second sentence was harder to integrate into that
hypothesis, because it said that she tried to give him
$2.50 back - it didn't say back, I guess. She tried to
give him $2.50 but he refused. I was trying to integrate
that into the racetrack hypothesis. And in order to do
that, I had to believe that the $2.50 was his change and
that he refused because it was the incorrect amount, but I
was suspicious at that point, because that seemed a little
strange; that didn't quite fit in.
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Then when you said, when they got inside, I believe
was the next sentence, I realized that I was wrong because
there was no reason for him and the woman behind the
window to be going anywhere together. I realized that the
person he'd given the money to was not the same as "she"
in the second sentence, and in fact they meant he and the
"she" who had tried to give him the money, and suddenly I
realized that she must have been his date, and it's hard
to say if I really realized it at that point or at the
point where you said, "so she bought a big bag of
popcorn," or whatever the rest of it was. But then I had
to reinterpret where the $2.50 had been coming from and it
all made sense; it came from his date and she wanted to
go dutch and he didn't, and so she bought the food when
they got inside.
Here we see the phrase "he plunked $5 down at the window" very
quickly triggers the idea of a racetrack bet. For other subjects,
it triggered a bank window or a theater window. Thus many subjects
apparently make a fast jump to a specific hypothesis that may or may
not be correct (Rubin, 1975).
How does such a phrase converge on one of these hypotheses?
What should be emphasized about this process is that the
"racetrack-betting schema," "the theater-going schema," and "the
bank-teller schema" all exist as prior knowledge structures for the
subjects. (See Schank, et al. (1975) or Lehnert (1977) for
descriptions of a restaurant-going schema, or Charniak (1975) for a
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description of a grocery-store-going schema.) These schemas
function as highly-constrained structures, which are competing to
fill their slots most successfully. This is a top-down process.
Simultaneously the words in the text trigger a number of potential
inferences. For example, $5 suggests the notion of buying or
giving; window suggests a house, office, car, bank, theater, or
racetrack window. These inferences are the kind that text-based
theories have been concerned with (see section on Text-Based vs.
Model-Based Inference). This is a bottom-up process. The selection
of a particular schema, such as the racetrack-betting schema,
depends on the conjunction of these two processes (Adams & Collins,
1978; Rumelhart, 1977a; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).
In the protocol each new piece of data from the text was
assimilated to the initial model in order to construct more refined
models of the text. Thus the "she" in the second sentence was
identified as the only other person necessary in the
racetrack-betting schema (or the bank or theater-going schema),
that is, the receiver of the money. When "she tried to give him
$2.50," people understood this as "change" which can be a subschema
in any of the three schemas people selected (though not so easily in
the bank-teller schema). But the man's refusal of the $2.50 causes
trouble for the notion of change; subjects try to explain the
refusal as a result of wrong change, but this seems shaky to them
because outright refusal is not the usual way to deal with wrong
change. Such a model is in worse trouble when "they" get inside.
It is possible for the person behind the window to go inside with
the man but highly unlikely. Many subjects probably introduced a
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third person at this point. But when she buys him popcorn, all the
subjects abandoned this incorrect model and jumped to the notion of
a date. Thus all the subjects drastically revised their initial
models in order to accommodate them to the information in the text.
Figure 1 shows the top-level structure of the model the subject
constructed while processing the first two phrases of the window
text. In a more complete representation of the model each box in
the diagram would be expanded into its underlying semantic
components (Schank, 1972; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975) and all the
variable bindings (which are represented by arrows) wouldc b shown.
The arrows coming out of any box represent the variable slots in the
schema for that concept (Norman & Rumelhart, 1975). These slots
must be specified in the conceptual representation of any schema,
such as putting, buying, or betting. We have represented unbound
variables as pending questions in circles and bound variables as
concepts in boxes. As the model develops over time, pending
questions turn into bound variables.
The figure attempts to show the progressive stages of
understanding and how these stages encompass the goals and
intentions of the characters. The first stage consists of a set of
pending questions that arise from the man putting down $5, such as
"Who was he?", "Why did he do it?", "Where was he?" Many of these
questions are answered as the subject's understanding progresses.
The second stage reflects the notion that the man is putting down
money toward the goal of buying something for which the money is
payment. The third stage reflects the full notion that the man's
goal is betting on a horse at a racetrack. At this point the
subject has constructed an initial model of the text.
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The next three stages show how new information is assimilated
to the initial model. Stage 4 again consists of a set of pending
questions about who tried to give whom $2.50, why they did it, and
how this event is connected with the first event. Stage 5 proposes
some tentative interrelations between the two events: "she" must be
the racetrack employee who received the $5, and "him" must be the
man who plunked down $5. In stage 6 the new information is fully
assimilated, by constructing a goal for the employee of returning
change to the man. This presupposes that the employee took the $5
and that the amount of the bet must have been $2.50. Thus the
initial model is modified slightly to change the betting stake from
$5 to $2.50. In general assimilation of new information is
accomplished by filling in intervening structures based on the
characters' goals and intentions, and making modifications to the
original structures where necessary.
Figure 2 shows how a model is restructured when new information
cannot be assimilated, as happened at the end of the window text.
The new structure preserves a few of the original bindings: the
plunking down $5 is still a "buying" event, the man who is offered
$2.50 is still the man who plunked down $5, and there is still an
employee who takes the $5. But most of the original bindings have
been abandoned: a new character (i.e., the man's date) has been
introduced, and it is she who offers the $2.5.0 in order to pay for
her own ticket to the movie. The process of rebinding all the
variables probably started with the introduction of this third
character. Each new binding led to other new bindings until the
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model was completely restructured. However, the process occurred
too quickly for the subject to describe; it is best seen in the
next protocol where another subject was trying to make sense of the
boating text.
The Questions Arising out of a Model
Any model the subject constructs raises a number of questions
that the subject tries to answer. For example, in constructing a
model for the window text, the subject considered the following
questions: "Where were they?" "Why did the man plunk down $5?" "Who
was the 'she' that tried to give him $2.50?" "Why did she try to
give him $2.50?" "Why did he refuse the $2.50?" "Why did she go
inside with him?" and "Why did she buy him popcorn?" Failure to
answer any of the questions can lead to restructuring the model.
Answering any of these questions leads to a more refined model, and
puts additional constraints on the answers to the other questions.
These questions derive from the unfilled variable slots in the
world knowledge schemas that are triggered by the understander's
attempt to construct a coherent goal-subgoal structure. This is
seen most clearly in a segment from a protocol on the boating text:
"Well if it was an open can it might not float, if water got into
it. Maybe if it was a closed can..." Here the subject is
considering possible values for the "lid" variable in the "coffee
can" schema. However, in most cases where the coffee can schema
might be needed to understand a text, it would never lead to a
question about the lid variable. Why does it in this text? The
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reason is that the lid variable is crucial to finding a method for
the goal of keeping the can afloat, which is a basic problem that
arises out of the statement of the text. The subject eventually
decided the can was closed. By fixing the variable in this way, she
constrained the model in order to help her converge on a solution.
Sometimes questions arise out of the answers to other
questions. For example, one of the subjects given the boating text
was working on the question "What was the function of the rocks?"
In doing so he considered the possibility that the rocks were
lighter than water and that their function was displacement of
water. This solution led in turn to two kinds of questions: "Are
there lighter-than-water rocks?" and "What kept the rocks in the
can?" The existence of pumice answers the first question, but in
turn leads to questions such as "Would there be pumice around Mystic
Pond?" The second question can be answered in terms of a lid, but
this raises the question of "How does water get into the can for the
rocks to displace?" These examples show how binding a new schema to
a slot in order to answer one question can lead to other questions
about how that schema interacts with the rest of the model.
However, at some point the process must converge, because subjects
usually do find a model that is satisfactory to them.
Constraint Satisfaction
The process by which people converge on a model that answers
these questions involves constraint satisfaction (Bobrow & Brown,
1975; Fikes, 1970; Waltz, 1975). Constraint satisfaction occurs
frequently in human problem solving. For example, consider
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cryptarithmetic problems, such as Fikes (1970) or Newell and Simon
(1972) analyzed. The problem is to figure out how to assign the
digits (0-9) to letters so that the addition is correct:
DONALD
+ GERALD
ROBERT
In this problem once the problem solver sees that E must be equal to
9 or 0, this constrains A to be either 4 or 5. To solve the
problem, subjects make initial default assignments (such as E=9) and
see if the constraints imposed by the assignments converge on a
solution. Like means-ends analysis, constraint satisfaction is a
pervasive part of cognitive processing.
Constraint satisfaction also arises in understanding scenes
made up of toy blocks (Waltz, 1975). The problem is to identify the
individual blocks making up the scene. In such scenes there are
different patterns of edges that occur both at corners of blocks or
where one block occludes another. The interpretation of one pattern
is constrained by the interpretations of the adjacent patterns
involving the same edges. In interpreting such scenes, the
convergence time depends on the amount of ambiguity in the possible
interpretations. As Winston (1977, P. 59) points out, if the
process starts at the edge of a scene where there is less ambiguity,
it converges much faster than if it starts in the middle of the
scene. Similarly, if humans focus on the center of a scene, they
find it much harder to identify the individual blocks, suggesting
that human vision depends on a process like constraint satisfaction.
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In understanding text, people try to answer the questions that
arise out of the models they construct. When any question is
answered, it constrains the solutions to other questions. Thus the
bottom-up search for relevant information becomes more and more
constrained as solutions to other questions are proposed. Sometimes
the entire process converges too quickly for subjects to introspect
about, as when the occurrence of "popcorn" caused a very fast
restructuring of the answers to all the questions about the window
text. Other times the process converges quite slowly as we will
detail for the boating text. But we doubt that the slow convergence
is a special case; rather we suspect it reveals the processing that
occurs when disconfirming evidence as well as confirming evidence is
encountered.
REVISING A MODEL
Problem Solving Strategies
In revising their model of a text, subjects bring to bear a
variety of problem solving strategies. We can best describe these
strategies in terms of their analogues in solving crossword puzzles.
We have listed below some common strategies that people use to solve
crossword puzzles. The column or row space where a word can be
inserted in a puzzle is called a slot to emphasize its
schema-theoretic correlate. In schema-theoretic terms the words
inserted in the puzzle are the values assigned to variable slots.
1. If the word generated for a slot leads to a conflict, then
generate a new word for that slot. (Rebinding)
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2. If you cannot think of a word that satisfactorily fills a slot,
then try to find another interpretation of the clue. (Question
Default Interpretation)
3. If the word generated for a slot leads to a conflict with a
crossing word, then question if that crossing word is correct.
(Question Direct Conflict)
4. If the word generated for a slot leads to a conflict with a
crossing word, then question the words that led to the selection
of that crossing word. (Question Indirect Conflict)
5. If you cannot think of a word that satisfactorily fills a slot,
then shift focus to find a crossing word to constrain the current
slot. (Near Shift of Foeus)
6. If you cannot thinW of a word that satisfactorily fills a slot,
then shift focus to find a non-crossing word to constrain words
crossing this word. (Distant Shift of Focus)
7. If there are a small set of possible words to fill a slot, try
each one to see how they fit with possible crossing words. (Case
Analysis)
8. If there are several possible words to fill a slot, tentatively
try the most likely word. (Most Likely Case Assignment)
There are two aspects of these strategies we should explain.
First, the two strategies we have referred to as "Indirect Conflict"
and "Distant Shift of Focus" can be more or less indirect or
distant. It depends on the number of steps between the new slot and
the old slot in terms of crosswords. For example, a conflict or a
shift cn be one step removed to a slot that intersects a crossing
word or two steps removed to a slot that intersects the one step
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removed slot, etc. A shift of focus of several steps is usually
tried only when a whole area is causing difficulty. Second, what we
have called "Question Default Interpretation" is tied to a whole set
of strategies for most skilled crossword puzzlers. For example, one
such strategy is to view the clue as a verb if you've been viewing
it as a noun. But these strategies are highly domain specific and
don't concern us here. What is important for our purposes is how
the eight strategies listed above appear to be domain independent. ,
A Subject's Protocol for the Boating Text
Most of these problem solving strategies can be seen in the
following protocol for the boating text. Because of the length of
the protocol, we have extracted only the most relevant segments:
1) Well immediately it doesn't make sense. I mean a can with
rocks wouldn't float. I am going back. Mystic Pond, I
don't think that could be anything other than a regular,
unless it's a fairy tale in which anything could happen.
I'm wondering if there is any other kind of coffee can it
could be other than the round ones I'm thinking of. And I
was wondering if there was any other kind of rocks there
could be except the usual ones.
2) Well I thought about halfway through maybe they were ice
sailing, but that wouldn't make sense that a can with
rocks would float on ice, so I don't think they were ice
sailing. It could be such salty water that a can with
rocks would float in it. I think there is such a one out
in Salt Lake City.
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3) Somebody wanted it to float, so they put rocks in it.
Well if it was an open can, it might not float if water
got into it. Maybe if it was a closed can and there was
air in it, it would float, but if it was closed why would
they put rocks in it. I mean if it was closed and there
was air in it, it doesn't seem like you would need rocks
to keep it afloat. I'm baffled.
4) No, I wouldn't settle on anything I've said; nothing I've
said really explains it.
5) Well the can was either opened and then somebody closed it
using a plastic lid or some other kind of lid, in which
case if they didn't open it, then I don't see how they
could have gotten the rocks into it, so they must have
opened it.
6) Maybe they put in a few rocks. Maybe that would make it
drift, not drift as far, but I don't know whether that's
true or not. Well if something's heavier, it won't move
as fast with the same amount of force applied to it, so
maybe they put a few rocks in.
7) Yeah, it says float there, not just float, so maybe they
put a few rocks in to keep it relatively stable and then
the rest was filled with air. I think that's what I would
settle on.
8) Well, I am assuming that there's currents, oh it's a pond.
OK, I'm assuming that there's currents or wind. Well,
there must have been some wind because they went sailing
so maybe if it was light like a leaf it would get blown
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all over the place because an empty coffee can would be
pretty light I would imagine. I think if they put a few
rocks in, though, it might not sink and that would weigh
it down a bit, so that it wouldn't get blown as far.
That's what I would guess.
The questions that this subject was trying to answer were
foremost "Why didn't the can sink?" and "What was the function of
the rocks?" Other subjects addressed different questions, as we
will show. The protocol shows abandonment of several answers to the
first question, then a solution to it, (there were only a few
rocks), and then a turning to the second question and a solution to
it, (the rocks functioned as an anchor). The subject did not, in
fact, arrive at the same solution as the one found by Bill in the
story. Bill's solution was that the rocks functioned as ballast to
keep the open can upright, and hence afloat. But the protocol does
illustrate most of the different kinds of problem solving strategies
that occur in the protocols collected.
Strategies in Revising a Model
The subjects were using the problem solving strategies listed
earlier in order to figure out the meaning of the texts. We will
give examples from the protocols of each of the strategies below:
Rebinding. The most common strategy seen in the protocols
(e.g., in Segments 2, 5, and 8 above) involves rebinding the current
slot. The strategy is simply: If a value that is bound to a
variable slot leads to a conflict, then try another binding for that
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variable. A clear case of the subject rebinding a previous solution
to the question "Why didn't the can sink?" occurs in the second
fragment. There she adopted a high-density-of-water solution by
considering the water as ice. But this solution produced an
immediate conflict: that the coffee can was said to be floating.
To patch this high-density solution, she thought of another way
(salt water) that water could be dense enough to hold up a
rock-filled can. In the fifth segment the subject considers the
possibility that the can had never been opened. This leads to a
conflict with the fact that the can had rocks in it, so the subject
resumes the assumption that the can had been opened. In the eighth
segment, there was a patch of the anchor solution where the subject
abandoned the notion that the can was anchored against currents, and
instead decided it was anchored against winds. Rebinding involves
keeping most of the model constructed up to the present point, and
changing only the last variable bound.
Figures 3 and 4 depict two of the attempts at rebinding by the
subject: Figure 3 shows the unsuccessful attempt in segment 2, and
Figure 4 shows the successful attempt in segment 8. In each case
the model constructed in attempting to answer a particular question
had an unbound slot that needed to be filled to make the model
plausible. (We have depicted the models here as a metaphorical
image that may not be too different from the kind of model people
actually have.) A first attempt at binding the slot failed on the
basis of the evaluation strategies described below. In Figure 3 the
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QUESTION:
FAIL
WHY DIDN'T THE CAN
WITH THE ROCKS IN
IT SINK? A
S FAIL N
TEST MATCH OF
MODEL TO TEXT-FAILS
[CONFLICT WITH TEXT]
S["FLOAT" AND "FLOATINGMJ
Figure 3. Rebinding the slot for a high-density medium
(protocol segment 2)
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Figure 4. Rebinding the slot for the force pushing on the can
(protocol segment 8)
second binding also failed leading to abandonment of that particular
model. In Figure 4, however, the rebinding succeeded and the
subject decided that the entire model was plausible.
Questioning a Default Interpretation. When subjects are not
getting anywhere, they often begin to question their default
assumptions. This can be seen most clearly in the first segment,
where the subject considered changing her initial default
assumptions that a) this is the real world, b) it is a standard
coffee can, and c) these are normal rocks. Some subjects elaborate
these possibilities by creating a fairy tale where the lake is only
a little pond and the can rests on the bottom, or by assuming the
rocks are lighter than water and their function is displacement of
water. This is an important problem solving strategy, because
assuming the wrong default values can often prevent subjects from
finding the correct solution, as happened to the subjects who
decided the coffee can was closed.
Questioning a Direct or Indirect Conflict. The strategy of
questioning a direct conflict can best be seen in the earlier
protocol on the window text. There the subject had bound the "she"
in the text as the person who received the money behind the window.
However, when "she" went inside with the man, this led the subject
to question her earlier binding of "she" to -the person behind the
window. This questioning of previous bindings is rather prevalentv
in dialogues.
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Sometimes the questioning of a particular binding may only
occur through a chain of inferences that are needed to support a
particular binding. For example, one subject had decided the coffee
can was covered with an air-tight plastic lid. This binding was
made when he initially heard in the text that the coffee can was
floating in the distance. Later when he was considering the
question about the function of the rocks, he considered the
possibility that the rocks were lighter than water (e.g. pumice) and
their function was to displace water. In order to displace water,
water had to be able to get into the can without the rocks getting
out. This led the subject indirectly to question the earlier lid
binding: what he needed was a leaky lid. Thus through a whole
chain of bindings the subject was led to question a binding made
much earlier.
Near or Distant Shift of Focus. Subjects in the protocols
sometimes move from a question they can't solve to a different
question. Often the new question is closely related to the old
question. For example, between segment 2 and segment 3 of the
protocol shown for the boating text, the subject changed the
question she was addressing from "Why didn't the can sink?" to "What
was the function of the rocks?" Then during segment 3 she changed
to the related question "Was the can open or closed?". Another
subject, when he wasn't getting anywhere with the question about the
function of the rocks, considered the more distantly related
question "What was the intention of the people who put the rocks in
the can?" By addressing a different question when in trouble, the
subject frees himself of some of the assumptions he's made in
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constructing his current model. It gives the subject a new
perspective by allowing him to start binding variables in a
different part of the structure (see paragraph on Constraint
Satisfaction in Vision).
The reason this strategy works is that the answer to one
question constrains the answers to other questions. For example,
the subject's solution in the sixth fragment that the can floated
because there were only a few rocks, apparently suggested the anchor
solution to the function question. Another subject, when he heard
the ballast solution, answered the question about the intention of
the people who put rocks in the can as follows: they must have been
kids who wanted the can to float, and to prevent it from floating on
its side, they put rocks in. Addressing different questions in i"
order to constrain other variables helps the subject converge on a
solution from a different angle.
Case Analysis and Most Likely Case Assignment. Often subjects
make tentative assignments as a deliberate strategy to constrain the
possible solutions so that the process will converge. Case analysis
is the systematic consideration of all alternatives possible cases.
This is what the subject did in the third segment, where she
considered whether the can was open or closed. Then in segment 5
she elaborated her model by making several likely case assignments:
that the can was closed, that a plastic lid was used, and that it
was empty except for the rocks. But these were tentative
assignments of variables; they were chosen only because they were
the most plausible values. Hypothetical reasoning on cases (i.e.,
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choosing either the most likely case, or the case that might
constrain the model the most) is a standard technique in constraint
satisfaction. By pinning these variables down to their most likely
values, the subject hoped to impose enough constraint so that the
process would converge (see section on Constraint Satisfaction).
Figure 5 depicts the case analysis strategy used by the subject
in segment 3. There the subject tried to bind the lid variable in
order to constrain her model. The first binding failed but the
second succeeded at the level of the particular slot it filled.
However, the entire model failed, because it didn't answer the basic
question about the function of the rocks. This illustrates how the
evaluation strategies described below are applied at different
levels in testing the plausibility of any model.
Evaluating the Model
The protocols showed that subjects evaluated a number of models
while trying to make sense of the texts. There are a number of
strategies they applied in order to evaluate the models, and these
strategies are linked to the conditions they used to either accept
or reject a model. The evaluation process is a complex one, but we
think we can specify at least four different tests that subjects
applied in evaluating the plausibility of the models they
constructed. The evidence from all these tests appears to be
weighed together in evaluating the plausibility of any model.
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1. The plausibility of the assumptions and consequences of the
model. In constructing any model, it is necessary to fill a number
of slots in the model with default values. Furthermore, the model
has certain consequences that follow from it. There are a number of
places in the protocols where subjects clearly are testing the
plausibility of the model's default assumptions and consequences.
For example, in the second segment of the protocol, the subject
tried to test the likelihood that Mystic Pond might be salty. To do
this she tried to think of cases of salt water lakes, and she came
up with the Great Salt Lake in Utah. Apparently in part, because of
the relative unavailability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) of salt water
lakes among the lakes she knew, she decided it was fairly
implausible that the Mystic Pond was salty. She may also have found
it implausible that salt water would hold up a can filled with
rocks. In the last segment she spent considerable effort
elaborating the anchor model to see if she could think of some force
(e.g. currents or winds) the rocks would anchor the can against.
All of these are tests of parts of the model against the subject's
world knowledge. They make use of the wide variety of strategies
people have for evaluating plausibility (Collins, Warnock, Aiello, &
Miller, 1975).
2. The completeness of the model. Models are evaluated in
terms of how well the assumptions and consequences of the model
answer all the different questions that arise. For example, the
salt-water-lake notion answers the question "Why didn't the can
sink?", but it doesn't answer the questions, "What was the function
of the rocks?" and "What were the intentions of the people who put
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the can in the lake?" Thus the salt-water model seems shaky because
it doesn't answer important questions that arise with respect to the
text.
3. The interconnectedness of the model. The assumptions or
consequences of a model are weighed with respect to how they fit
together with other aspects of the model. When particular
assumptions are unsupported by other parts of the model, the whole
model seems shakier. For example, when the subject was considering
currents and winds as forces acting on the can, she rejected
currents because they didn't fit with the fact that it was a pond.
But she accepted winds because the people were sailing which
requires winds. In her final model then, winds enter in two ways:
to sail the boat and to provide a force to anchor the can against.
Subjects appear to put more belief in the plausibility of the model
if the different pieces tie together in more than one way.
4. The match of the model to the text. Very often subjects
seem to weigh the model in terms of how well its assumptions or
consequences match particular aspects of the text. For example, in
the second segment the subject decided that "sailing" on the lake
could be "ice sailing", but that if the can was held up by ice, it
wouldn't really be "floating." Thus, we see a careful matching
(Collins & Loftus, 1975; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974) of the
concepts implied by the model against surface aspects of the text.
In making judgments about the plausibility of a model, subjects
weigh all these different factors against each other. Sometimes,
each particular aspect of the model may be acceptable in and of
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itself, but taken together the whole thing seems shaky. This may
have been why the one subject rejected the salt-water model or
another subject rejected the lighter-than-water-rocks (e.g. pumice)
model. However, these four tests are not exhaustive; they merely
encompass the major factors the subjects expressed concern about in
the protocols.
In the subjects' evaluation of models there appears to be a
parallel to the distinction in science between a model's ability to
explain prior data and its ability to predict new data. For the
most part in the protocols the subjects are evaluating prior data.
But in the seventh segment there is a striking case where the
subject's model led to a prediction that was confirmed by referring
to the text (test 4 above). Her model implied that the function of
the rocks was to keep the can stationary. Then looking at the text
again, she found in Bill's remark a "there" which could be
interpreted as meaning "in that one place." This confirmation of a
prediction from the model seemed to give her much more confidence in
her model. There is no way to tell for sure, but this suggests that
making a successful prediction may act to increase confidence more
than finding a successful account of prior data.
IMPLICATIONS FOR READING COMPREHENSION
In our schools we do not typically teach children what to do
when they cannot comprehend a text. Furthermore, the strategies
children have developed to deal with comprehension difficulties in
conversation (e.g. ask a question or look puzzled) do not apply in
reading (Rubin, 1978). At this point children need to develop a
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whole new set of strategies for what to do when they don't
understand. It is just such strategies that we see so ubiquitously
in the protocols of the adults we studied.
One failure that occurred in the adult protocols is perhaps
revealing of what may go wrong when a child cannot understand a
text. One of the subjects, in dealing with the boating text,
apparently failed to make much sense of it because she tried to
answer the wrong questions about the text. First she dealt with the
question "Who were John and Bill?" Because she quickly figured out
who John and Bill were, she thought the problem for the reader in
understanding the text was going to be to figure out their
identities, just as in a mystery story. Bill's remark at the end
then violated her expectations about the point of the story. This
in turn led her to ask the question "Why didn't Bill explain what
the rocks were doing in the can?" This too is a reasonable question
about Bill's intentions, but it does not help find answers to the
major questions posed by the text, i.e. "Why didn't the can sink"
and "What was the function of the rocks." She did not ignore these
questions altogether, but she did not focus on them enough to find a
solution. Nor was she exceptional. Another subject, who focussed
on the question "What was the intention of the people who put the
rocks in the can," which seems from Bill's remark to be the correct
question, also failed because the question leads down blind alleys.
It brings up issues such as, "Who were the people who put rocks in
the can?", "What were they trying to accomplish?" (e.g. catching
lobsters or raindrops), "Were they playing some game, doing some
job, or trying to confuse John and Bill?" These examples suggest
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that one of the most critical skills may be to choose the right
questions to focus one's problem solving skills upon. But the
protocols do not tell us how people make these choices.
The theory outlined here provides a framework for studying
specific questions about text understanding. For example: How do
skilled readers formulate questions about a text? What strategies
do they use to revise the models they construct to answer these
questions? How do they evaluate those models? These questions
address the strategies essential for dealing with difficult texts.
By pinpointing the strategies that skilled readers use for dealing
with difficulties in understanding, it should become clear what
strategies unskilled readers must learn.
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